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Introduction
Dynamic games are a very useful analytical tool for the theory of resource allocation and capital accumulation under imperfect competition. Over the last two decades a number of authors have studied the fundamental issues of existence, uniqueness, and e ciency of non-cooperative equilibria in such games see, e.g., 1, 3, 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 1 0 , 11, 13 . The standard model underlying these papers involves a single resource stock or capital stock which can be used by nitely many agents. The papers di er from each other mainly in the way h o w time is modelled as a discrete variable or a continuous one and in the assumptions imposed on the utility functions and the growth function of the resource, respectively. In the present paper we are concerned with a very general form of this common property resource game with n identical players and a continuous time variable. The growth function of the natural resource and the utility functions of the players are assumed to satisfy standard concavity and smoothness assumptions. In addition, we assume that the elasticity o f i n tertemporal substitution of the utility function is bounded below by n=n , 1 and that there exists an upper limit for the resource extraction rate of each agent. Our model is therefore a generalization of the one in 5 where the elasticity of intertemporal substitution was assumed to be constant and equal to n=n , 1. For the rst main result we assume that the resource is su ciently productive and prove that this implies that there exist in nitely many symmetric Nash equilibria of the game. They consist of stationary Markovian strategies which means that the actions of the players depend only on the present state of the game the resource stock and not on past states, the actions of their opponents, or time. The proof is based on existence theorems for solutions to ordinary di erential equations. More speci cally, we derive an auxiliary di erential equation from the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation which has to be satis ed by the policy functions of the players. This equation is shown to have a solution from which a solution to the original Hamilton-JacobiBellman equation can be constructed. The fact that there exist in nitely many symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibria was already discussed in the more restricted model of 5 w ere the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation could be solved explicitly. It shows that neither the symmetry assumption nor the requirement of subgame perfectness is su cient to reduce the set of Nash equilibria to a nite set. E ciency of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria is an issue which has received considerable attention in the literature. Intuition suggests that the lack of cooperation Nash equilibrium and retaliation Markovian strategies would lead to overexploitation of the resource. This intuition has indeed been conrmed in many studies e. g., 1, 5, 10, 11 and the equilibria discussed above do also have the feature of overexploitation. Dutta and Sundaram, on the other hand, have shown in 7, 8 that, in general, underexploitation of the resource cannot be ruled out. In the present paper we demonstrate a weaker but related result. We show that for all T 0 and all 0 one can nd a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium such that the equilibrium state trajectory spends at least T time periods in the -neighborhoodof the ecient steady state provided that the initial stock of the resource is su ciently high. Because T and can bechosen arbitrarily this can beregarded as an approximative e ciency theorem. In the second main result of the paper we characterize the conditions under which driving the resource stock d o wn to zero as fast as possible is a Markovperfect equilibrium. We derive a necessary and su cient condition for such a scenario to be possible. It is furthermore shown that this condition is satis ed provided that at least one of the following three properties holds: there are su ciently many players, the players are su ciently impatient, or the upper limit for the extraction rates is su ciently high. It is demonstrated that there may exist parameter speci cations under which both most rapid extinction and a positive steady state resource stock can coexist as the outcomes of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria. The model formulation and the assumptions are presented in Section 2 where we also state the two main theorems of the paper. The proofs of these theorems can befound in Section 3. Section 4 presents concluding remarks and open questions. Some more technical results needed in the paper are derived in an appendix.
Model formulation and results
We consider a continuous time model of a renewable resource which is simultaneously exploited by n non-cooperating agents. The stock of the resource at time t 2 0; 1 is denoted by xt and the harvesting rate of agent i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; n g at time t is c i t. The natural growth rate of the resource depends on the existing stock xt and is given by the function Fxt. We shall also refer to xt as the state of the system. It follows from the above assumptions that the state trajectory x is a solution of the initial value problem _ xt = F x t , The interpretation of this constraint is that negative harvesting rates are excluded 1 , that nothing can be harvested if the stock size is equal to zero, and that there is a xed upper bound, k 0, on the feasible harvesting rates due to capacity limitations. This completes the formulation of the model. The fundamentals of the game are n, F, U, r, k, and z. We are now going to state and discuss the assumptions which will be used throughout the paper. A5: For all c 2 0; k it holds that c n , 1=n.
Note that c ,1 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution at the consumption level c. Assumption A4 requires that this elasticity is a su ciently smooth function of c and remains bounded at c = 0 . Assumption A5, on the other hand, relates the elasticity o f i n tertemporal substitution to the number of players by requiring that the former is su ciently high at all consumption levels. The analysis in 5 makes also use of properties A1 and A3 but it uses stronger assumptions concerning the utility function U. More speci cally, instead of A2, A4, and A5 it is assumed in 5 that c = n , 1=n for all c 2 0; k , i. e., that the utility function exhibits constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution. 4 A strategy for player i 2 f1; The conditions in this de nition are the minimal requirements for the state trajectory in 1 and the objective functionals in 2 to bewell de ned and unique. On the other hand, we do not exclude general history dependent strategies like trigger strategies from consideration. We shall only consider admissible n-tuples of strategies throughout the paper.
De nition 2 Let G = n; F; U; r; k ; z beagiven game and 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n an n-tuple of strategies that is admissible for G. Furthermore, denote by J i 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n the value of player i's objective functional in 2 when the players use the strategies 1 , 2 , . . . , and n , respectively. We say that 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n is a Nash equilibrium if for all i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; n g and for any strategy~ i such that 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; i ; : : : ; n is admissible for G it holds that J i 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; i ; : : : ; n J i 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; i ; : : : ; n .
A Nash equilibrium consisting of stationary Markovian strategies will be called a stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium. If = 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n is a Nash equilibrium not only for G = n; F; U; r; k ; z but also for all games of the form n; F; U; r; k ; x where x 2 0; 1 then we call subgame-perfect.
A stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium which is subgame-perfect is also called a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. Since subgame-perfect equilibria are independent of the initial state we may omit the initial state from the speci cation of the game and simply say that is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game G = n; F; U; r; k . If a Nash equilibrium is such that all players use the same strategy then we say that the equilibrium is symmetric. Because in the game under consideration all players are identical it is natural to focus on symmetric equilibria. We are now ready to state the rst result of the paper. c Let x t; z denote the state at time t generated by the equilibrium with parameter 2 0 ; 1 when the initial state is equal to z. For all z 2 0; 1 and all 2 0 ; 1 it holds that lim t1 x t; z =
x where x 2 0; x n . d For all initial states z x 1 , all 0, and all T 0 there exists a parameter 2 0 ; 1 such that ft 2 0; 1 j j x t ; z , x 1 j g T . 6 P art a of the theorem deals with the existence of in nitely many Markovperfect Nash equilibria, part b describes the shape of the policy functions, and part c shows that the long-run steady states of these equilibria, x , are strictly smaller than x n and therefore also strictly smaller than the e cient steady state x 1 . In the usual terminology see, e. g., 7 the result from c says that the equilibria constructed in the theorem lead to a tragedy of the commons. Part d, on the other hand, shows that one can nd Markovperfect Nash equilibria for which the resource stock stays in an arbitrary small neighborhood of the e cient steady state for arbitrary long time provided the initial stock z is su ciently high. One can therefore approximate the e cient steady state by state trajectories generated from Markov-perfect Nash equilibria. Condition 4 is su cient but not necessary for the results a -d to hold. It is easy to prove that 4 implies x n 0 which, according to the de nition of x n , is equivalent to the condition F 0 0 rn. 7 Therefore, 4 can be interpreted by saying that the slope of the function Fx on the interval 0; x 1 has to be su ciently high as compared to the discount rate r and the numberof players n. In other words, the resource has to besu ciently productive for small stock sizes. In the case where the resource is not very productive as compared to r and n intuition suggests that the situation where all players exhaust the resource at a maximal rate quali es as an equilibrium. This makes sense because if r is large then the players are very impatient and they do not care much about the conservation of the resource, and if n is large then the erce competition reinforces the tragedy of the commons. In the following result we con rm this intuitive reasoning by deriving a necessary and su cient condition for maximal exploitation to be an equilibrium. We also show that a high capacity limit k implies that maximal exploitation is an equilibrium.
Theorem 2 a If G = n; F; U; r; k is a game satisfying A1 -A5 then the following two conditions are equivalent: c Assume F, U, r, and k are given such that A1, A2, and A4 are satis ed and such that supf c j c 2 0; k g 1 . If n is su ciently large then A3, A5 and 5 are also satis ed.
d Assume n, F, U, and r are given such that A1, A2, A4, and A5 are satis ed and such that lim c!1 c n , 1=n. If k is su ciently large then A3 and 5 are also satis ed.
Part a of the theorem states a necessary and su cient condition for maximal exploitation to be an equilibrium. This condition is quite easy to check for any given game n; F; U; r; k . Parts b, c, and d, on the other hand, show that any of the following properties is, ceteris paribus, a su cient condition for maximal exploitation to bean equilibrium: the discount rate r is high, the numberof players n is large, or the capacity limit k is high. It should benoted that the conditions of Theorems 1 and 2 do not exclude each other. There may besituations in which both 4 and 5 are satis ed so that there exist both the in nitely many equilibria described in Theorem 1 as well as the most rapid extinction equilibrium of Theorem 2. For example assume that n, F, U, and r are given such that A1, A2, A4, A5, 4, and lim c!1 c n , 1=n are satis ed. Since 4 does not depend on the value of k, Theorem 2d tells us that we may increase k without a ecting the validity o f a n y of A1, A2, A4, A5, and 4, and at the same time ensure that A3 and 5 hold as well. We can substitute this into 8 to obtain rV x = U x +U 0 x Fx , n x .
Assuming di erentiability o f and V we can di erentiate this equation with respect to x. 8 Together with 11 this yields rU 0 x = U 0 x 0 x+U 00 x 0 x F x , n x +U 0 x F 0 x , n 0 x :
Dividing by U 0 x which is strictly positive by A2 and using the denition of from A4 we can rewrite this equation as follows. Any such trajectory satis es 0 x k for all x 2 0; x 1 . It holds that x is strictly increasing with respect to both x and .
Proof. There exist local solutions to 12 by the Cauchy-Peano existence theorem. Because the function G is locally Lipschitz continuous on D these solutions have to be unique. Now consider any point P = x 1 ; as described in the lemma see also Figure 1 . Since the vector eld de ned by 8 We shall later verify that and V are indeed di erentiable for x 2 0; x 1 so that this heuristic argument can be made rigoros. 9 For the following analysis the reader may nd it useful to look at Figure 1 where D and , are depicted. 10 In Figure 1 one such point is indicated and labelled as P . Note that because of A3 we have k F x 1 =n so that a continuum of such points exists.
G is pointing upwards on D, we know that any solution terminating in P must be strictly increasing on the interval 0; x 1 . Going backwards from P the trajectory therefore cannot leave the domain D through its upper boundary. Similarly, i t cannot leave D through its lower boundary, because lim &0 Gx; = 0 so that the vector eld becomes horizontal at the lower boundary. It follows that any local solution can becontinued on the entire interval 0; x 1 . The other assertions of the lemma are obvious.
2
The trajectories mentioned in Lemma 1 terminate at points above the curve , when x = x 1 . In the following lemma we show that all solution curves with close to Fx 1 =n cross the curve , exactly once. We also derive an inequality which describes the behavior of these trajectories close to x = 0 . T o simplify the notation we de ne 0 = Fx 1 =n. In the limit as x approaches zero this yields Fx 1 rnx 1 which is a contradiction to 4. Thus, we have proved that the trajectory 0 must cross ,. By continuity of solutions of 12 with respect to the boundary condition this implies that also all trajectories with 2 0 ; must cross , provided that is greater than but su ciently close to 0 .
Lemma 2 Let
To complete the proof of part a we h a v e to show that any trajectory with 2 0 ; can cross the line , only once and that the crossing point Proof. Part a follows immediately from the construction of the functions and from the properties we have shown before. To prove part b rst note that the maximand in 7 is a strictly concave function with respect to c. To prove that c = x is the unique maximizer it is therefore su cient to verify the rst order condition U 0 x = V 0 x. Since V x was de ned by 14 this condition is automatically satis ed. To verify 8 we have to show that U0 + r Z x 0 U 0 y dy = U x + U 0 x Fx , n x : 16
As in the proof of Lemma 3 one can show that U 0 x M M , 0 x , 0 holds for all su ciently small x 0. Furthermore, we h a v e F x F 0 0x for all x 2 0; 1 because of concavity of F. Putting these inequalities together and using the fact that 0 x Fx=n holds for all x 2 0;
x we obtain 0 U 0 x Fx , n x U 0 xF x F 0 0M M , 0 x 1 , 0 for all su ciently small x 0. Since 0 2 0; 1 this implies that lim x&0 U 0 x Fx, n x = 0. It follows that 16 holds for x = 0. To show that 16 also holds true for all x 2 0; x 1 it su ces therefore to prove that the derivative with respect to x of the left hand side of 16 equals the derivative with respect to x of the right hand side of 16 for all x 2 0; x 1 . Using 12 it is straightforward to show that this is indeed the case. Proof. We h a v e seen before that the functions satisfy 0 = 0 and 0 x k for all x 2 0; 1 . Moreover, they are continuously di erentiable on the intervals 0; x 1 and x 1 ; 1 . At x = x 1 they have a jump discontinuity. x ; x 1 . Consequently, the right hand side of 1 is strictly negative whenever xt is close to x 1 so that existence of absolutely continuous solutions to 1 is guaranteed.
2
Lemma 7 Let be the strategy de ned by the policy function for some 2 0 ; 1 . Then it follows that ; ; : : : ; is a symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. One has to show that is an optimal policy function for the optimal control problem of player i 2 f 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n g when all the other players use the policy function . This can bedone by a standard argument using the boundedness of the optimal value function V and the Hamilton-JacobiBellman equation which was veri ed in the previous subsections. The fact that the optimal value function V is not di erentiable at x = x 1 does not cause any problem because the state trajectory x t; z satis es x t; z = x 1 at most at a single point in time. Since the right hand side attains its unique maximum at x = x 1 it follows that 5 is su cient for the rst order condition to hold and, hence, for the fact that maximal exploitation is a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. The value of the path generated by the policy function~ and the initial condition z = x 1 is therefore V = R T 0 e , rt Uk, hx t dt+e ,rT U0=r. Since, by assumption, = 0 corresponds to an optimal path, we must have To prove b we rst note that r F 0 0 is equivalent t o x 1 = 0 . Therefore, 5 is equivalent t o U 0 k U k , U 0 =nk. The validity of this inequality follows from Lemma B in the appendix by letting approach 0. The proof of assertion c is straightforward and uses the fact that the right hand side of 5 converges t o 0 a s n approaches in nity. 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we h a v e considered a very general model of the joint exploitation of a renewable resource by a nite number of non-cooperating agents. We have focussed on the existence, non-e ciency, and multiplicity of Markovperfect Nash equilibria. Our main results are that there exist in nitely many equilibria which lead to a tragedy of the commons provided the resource is su ciently productive, that one can approximate with arbitrary high precision the e cient steady state by state trajectories generated by these equilibria provided that the initial stock of the resource is su ciently high, and that the situation where all agents exploit the resource at maximal rate quali es as an equilibrium provided that there are either very many agents, very impatient agents, or very e ective agents.
Although these results seem to be very comprehensive they probably raise more questions than they answer. Which equilibrium will be selected out of the in nite set of equilibria? How can agents coordinate on those equilibria that are more e cient? How can agents prevent getting trapped in the most rapid extinction equilibrium? Are there even more Markov-perfect equilibria in this model, perhaps equilibria resulting in underconsumption as in 7, 8 ? We believe that answering these questions is essential for a better understanding of renewable resource markets. At the present moment, however, we are still unable to say anything substantial about these issues. Apart from these fundamental questions there are also some other more technical open problems which w e propose as topics for future research. First of all, our analysis is not complete in the sense that the existence conditions 4 and 5 do not cover all possible cases. This has been demonstrated by the example at the end of Section 2. Other open problems concern the major structural assumptions of the present paper, A1 and A5. Although assumption A1 is frequently imposed in models of common property resource extraction it is not undisputed. As a matter of fact, depending on the type of resource under consideration it may be more realistic to consider nonconcave growth functions F. The cases of depensation F x is convex for small x, concave for large x, and strictly positive for all x 2 0; 1 and critical depensation F x i s c o n v ex for small x, concave for large x, negative for small x, and positive for large x are of particular interest see 2, p. 17 . In these cases the results of Theorem 1 will most likely fail. Markov-perfect Nash equilibria, if they exist at all, can beconjectured to have a structure which is quite di erent from the equilibria in Theorem 1. In particular, one would conjecture that already in the case of depensation there exists a positive stock levelx such that extinction is ineviatable for all initial stocks smaller thanx. This conjecture is motivated by the results for the one-player version of model 1 -3 with depensation which is analyzed in 12 . 13 As for assumption A5 we do not know h o w its relaxation would e ect the results of the present paper. It is used at two di erent places in the analysis: to ensure that the vector eld de ned by 12 is pointing upwards and in Lemma B in the appendix. We believe, however, that the structure of equilibria would be a ected quite dramatically if one were to relax A5. Finally, w e think that the analysis of the game with asymmetric players would be a worthwhile project. 
